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THE COORDINATION OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY
AND THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE INTERESTS:
SOME SUGGESTED PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
WOLFGANG E. BURHENNEt and
WILLIAM A. IRWINtt
Man must conserve the world's natural resources, not only for
their sake, but for his own. Conserving our environment requires
rethinking the relationship between private interests and public
needs. Adjusting the balance between them to correct the excesses
and remedy the shortcomings will demand changes and sacrifices.
Education is slow to persuade the majority of people that they must
modify their traditional behavior and beliefs. Meanwhile, responsible
governments must plan and execute policies which will prevent en-
vironmental crises. The appropriate philosophical basis for these
policies is pragmatism, the circumspect employing of principles to
produce desired consequences which will be compatible with other
policies.
This article suggests a series of such principles, to be kept in mind
in formulating environmental policies, divided roughly into a) the
regulation of private interests; b) the coordination of legislative
policy; and c) the participation of the public.
REGULATION OF PRIVATE INTERESTS
A. Objectively Reviewing Governmental and Commercial Projects,
Processes and Products for Environmental Effects
Considering the expense and occasional impossibility of remedying
environmental damage, an ounce of prevention may today require
several pounds of "cure."
Prevention of environmental crises is the goal of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.' Broadly, this statute requires
federal agencies to make a comprehensive study of environmental
effects before action is taken on proposed legislation or programs.
Whether or not the statute is effective is another and important issue.
But the practices of consulting with others, comparing alternatives
and considering potential environmental impacts should be more fully
t Secretary-General, Interparlamentarische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Interparliamentary
Working Center), Bonn, Germany; Chairman, Committee on Environmental Law, Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.
ttA.B., 1965, J.D., 1970, University of Michigan.
1. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-43 (Supp. V, 1970).
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adopted by all governmental units. They are simply rational means of
making decisions with sufficient information and perspective.
Currently private enterprise in introducing new products and
processes is under public pressure to conform to standards which will
conserve the world's natural resources and leave the earth a pleasant
place. Just as drug and foodstuff producers must now test products
carefully before marketing them,2 all commercial enterprises should
be required both to test new products and processes of production
before introducing them and to consider environmental effects in
plant location. Obviously, most manufacturers do some testing now.
The need is to broaden the scope of questions asked beyond effec-
tiveness and predicted profits to such matters as long-run environ-
mental and health effects, alternatives, and possibilities for recycling.
This testing should be followed by an objective check, either by an
improved licensing procedure for trade products and processes, or by
judicial examination of potential adverse environmental effects, as is
possible in Michigan under Public Act 127 of 1970.'
B. Require Compulsory Insurance for Unusually
Dangerous Enterprises
Compulsory insurance should be required for enterprises which
currently engage in activities unusually dangerous to the environ-
ment, such as drilling and transportation of oil. Up to a certain limit,
the insurance would cover the damage these enterprises might cause.
Whether liability should be based on negligence,4 or whether the
enterprises should be liable up to the established limit without fault,
might be determined according to the nature of the activity and its
potential for damage. Strict liability is not a radical proposal; in 1970
the members of both the U.S. Congress and the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization adopted such an approach for
damages caused by oil spills at sea.' Nor is the problem of measuring
environmental damages any longer insuperable.
Above the limit of liability, the government might assume re-
sponsibility for sharing the burden of costs and losses.6 If it is unwill-
ing to undertake this risk, it should refuse to license the enterprise.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1964).
3. Mich. Compiled Laws § § 691.1201-691.1207 (Supp. 1970).
4. Or its variant, res ipsa loquitur, which creates a rebuttable presumption of defendant's
negligence if he is in exclusive control of the instrumentality of damage and the event would
not normally occur in the absence of negligence.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(0 (Supp. 1970-71); Int7 Convention on Civil Liability For Oil
Pollution Damage, Art. III, 2, 1 I.E.L.R. 40307 (1971). There are exceptions to liability, so
that it is not absolutely strict, but they are quite narrow. See Goldie, Int7 Principles of
Responsibility for Pollution, 9 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 283 (1970).
6. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1964).
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Holding the government jointly liable might have the beneficial side
effect of improving the care and integrity of its licensing pro-
cedures.7
Compulsory insurance can serve as an effective device to promote
self-enforcement of safety standards. Instead of relying on (and pay-
ing for) maritime officials to enforce safety standards for oil tankers,
for example-which allows all sorts of possibilities for abuse-
requiring insurance would impel ship-owners to provide the neces-
sary precautions in order to pass the insurance companies'
inspection, and procure the lowest possible premium. This approach
would require government regulation of insurance companies but
such is already common practice.
C. Implementing the Principle That He Who Generates
Wastes Should Pay For Disposing of Them
Instead of employing already insufficient public revenues to pay
for the disposal of abandoned waste, e.g., beer cans, old tires, used
oil, dead cars-all too often simply deposited at the first convenient
spot-the principle should be that he who is responsible for creating
wastes should pay the costs of their disposal or delivery for recycling.
Germany has put this concept of charging the originator of the
waste into practice in a unique system for the disposal of used lubri-
cating oils.8 Prior to the new law, the government tried making
subsidy payments to refineries which collected and reprocessed waste
oil into lubricating oils, but this proved ineffective, since the re-
fineries collected only from profitable areas and accepted only those
waste oils which could be easily regenerated. As of 1969, all pro-
ducers and importers of oil were required to pay the government a
fee for every ton of fresh oil.9 They pass along this extra expense in
the form of higher prices (about 11/2 cents per quart) to their cus-
tomers. The government uses the collected fees to fund payments to
contractors obligated to pick up any waste oil free of charge from
anyone in Germany. These payments are to cover the contractors'
costs of collection and harmless disposal. The contractors may either
reprocess the waste oils (and sell their end products) or burn them.
The Waste Oil Law establishing this system provides several means
7. Cf Cavers, Improving Financial Protection of the Public Against the Hazards of
Nuclear Power, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 644 (1964); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in
Technology Assessment, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 587, 653-55 (1969).
8. Gesetz Uber Massnahmen Zur Sicherung der Altoelbeseitigung (Law Concerning
Measures To Assure The Disposal Of Waste Oil), I Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBI.) 1419 (1968).
9. Id., § 4(2). The fee is approximately $20/ton.
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for close checking to assure that disposal does not contribute to air,
water, or soil pollution." 0
How the system of making the originator of an environmental
problem bear the cost of its solution is set up depends largely on the
government's administrative organization. Ideally, the system should
be self-supporting and offer comprehensive collection, assured safe
disposal or recycling, and careful supervision. New York City, for
example, where an average of 200 cars are abandoned every day and
50,000 summonses were issued last year as a result, has requested the
legislature to enact a bill requiring the purchaser of any new car to
deposit one hundred dollars with the state.' ' If the car is resold
during its lifetime, the certificate of deposit would figure in the price
and pass to the new owner. The final owner would be refunded the
sum upon providing he had disposed of the car "in an environ-
mentally acceptable manner." One acceptable manner might be
delivery to a scrap metal dealer. In Maryland these dealers are paid
ten dollars per disposed car and are fined for every one they keep
over 18 months. This program is funded by a one dollar fee imposed
on every car title transaction in the state.
D. Redefine the Scope of Private Land Ownership Rights
The inviolability of all privately owned land on our crowded
planet is no longer either realistic or consonant with this century's
democratic social values. No man is an island in our society, and
neither should his property be. We are beyond the time when the
principle of sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedus-use your property
only thus as will not harm another's-is alone an adequate basis for
public policy. Environmental planning and policy administration
responsive to evolving needs are only possible where the definitions
of private property are flexible and permit the implementation of
different policies suitable to the special requirements of particular
areas. We pay the price of our unwillingness to limit our continually
expanding populations and economies in many ways. Perhaps tol-
10. See Irwin and Burhenne, A Model Waste Oil Disposal Program in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, forthcoming in 1 Ecology L.Q.
11. London Daily Telegraph, Jan. 21, 1971, at 1, col. 6. The Council on Environmental
Quality has concluded that such a "bounty system ... is not practicable." Its arguments are
listed in Environmental Quality, First Annual Rep. of the Council on Environmental Quality
116 (1970). They include: "The resulting fund of payments would divert billions of dollars
from other investments in the private economy. Administration and enforcement of the
system would require excessive increases in government personnel and expenditures." Such
arguments might be made against almost every proposal to do something on behalf of the
environment. Perhaps judgment might be withheld until after some state had given such a
system a fair trial.
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erating increased public regulation of land use is preferable to suffer-
ing increased trespass, vandalism, or worse.
Redefining the scope of private ownership rights to reflect the
increasing needs of society must be accomplished with the utmost
circumspection. Regulating what the owner must endure and what
the public may do should be based on a thorough and continual
assessment of the interests and requirements peculiar to defined areas
of settlement. In return for his sacrifices, the owner must be assured
that public access to his forest land, for example, will be adequately
controlled so that his land will not be overrun or its value to him
destroyed. There must be specific and enforceable minimum
standards to protect his personal property.
Eighty percent of the land in West German nature preserves estab-
lished by public authority is under private ownership. An owner
whose property is taken into a preserve may not be prevented, with-
out compensation, from continuing his previous use of the land, but
he is prohibited from changing or expanding its existing use without
special permission.' 2 Being deprived of the chance to take advantage
of increases in the land's speculative value is not a compensable
taking of private property-it is a sacrifice the owner must make as a
member of society.
If society must expropriate private property to serve public needs,
the owner should not be allowed unlimited compensation. It is unfair
for one who happens to be located where a waste water treatment
plant is required to get rich on public tax revenues. This can be
remedied by placing a legal limit on the percentage increase over the
land's previous value which one may collect. If the limit were ex-
ceeded, the excess could be taxed as the luxury it is. Similarly, if the
value of land of those living near a new public highway or recreation
project increases by more than a certain percentage, the excess could
be collected and redistributed to those whose land was taken.
The legislature of the densely populated industrial state of North
Rhine-Westphalia in Germany recently enacted an unusual approach
to balancing public and private land use. To provide sorely needed
additional recreational opportunities, privately owned forest lands
were opened to use by the public, which enters at its own risk,
without compensation to the owners.'" The results of this law are
still uncertain. Some forests near large cities are so heavily used by
walkers and picnickers as to constitute an arguable partial ex-
12. Reichsnaturschutzgesetz § 16(2), of June 26, 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt I 821.
13. Forstgesetz fur das Land NordrheinWestfalen (Forest Law of the State of North
Rhine-Westphalia) of July 29, 1969, GVB1.588, as amended Dec. 16, 1969, [1970] GVB1.
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propriation. In other areas where owners' fire insurance premiums or
refuse collection costs have increased significantly as a result of the
law, the State may need to help defray these expenses.
COORDINATION OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY
A. Use Both Sugarbread and the Whip
Many countries have learned that prohibitions alone are not
enough to effectuate environmental conservation policies. The prob-
lem is that the prohibitions cannot be adequately enforced. What is
needed is the coordinated use of both prohibitions and incentives.
Begin by setting air pollution emission limits, for example, neces-
sitating the purchase of control equipment. In conjunction, offer
reduced property or sales tax on the equipment, accelerated depre-
ciation for tax write-offs of its purchase price, or less expensive
government-supported loans to finance the investment. These are
rational, if not always stunningly successful, economic incentives.
Outright grants to private enterprise, on the other hand, are rarely,
if ever, justified. They conflict with the principle, discussed above,
that those who cause environmental hazards should pay for disposing
of them. And-if supported from tax revenues-they unfairly sub-
sidize, at the public's expense, marginal or inefficient enterprises
which probably should be reorganized, absorbed, or dismantled.
The critical element in an effective tax incentive policy is
thorough and ready enforcement of the legal standards. Since the
amount of incentive given (unless it is an outright grant) will always
be less than the expense of control, a person or enterprise will always
be tempted to keep expenses down by doing as little as possible.
Penalties if one is caught violating the standards must be severe
enough, and the publicity given the infraction by the media un-
pleasant enough, that it is less expensive to take advantage of the
incentive and carry out the necessary measures.
B. A void Public Finance Policies With Negative
Environmental Side-Effects
Incentives offered via tax or fee provisions are conscious legislative
decisions. Unfortunately, not all taxes and fees are free from inad-
vertent negative consequences for the environment. In Germany, for
example, where yearly automobile license fees are based on the
volume of the car's cylinders (the larger the volume, the higher the
fee), auto manufacturers have, as a result, developed and are pro-
ducing cars with very small cylinders but remarkably high power. To
achieve this power the engine must work much faster, causing less
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efficient combustion proportionally than in larger cylinders-hence
more air pollutants, and incidentally, more noise.
In many countries, the community where an industry locates re-
ceives both property and business taxes from it. Understandably, to
increase their tax base and job opportunities for their citizens, many
communities strive to attract industries. Sometimes they offer them
a special concession which disadvantages the environment-zoning
variances, or sotto voce assurances that pollution control standards
will not be "unreasonably" enforced. To alleviate this problem, and
to equalize the distribution of revenues, Germany recently revised its
tax laws so that communities can receive only a certain percentage of
all taxes paid by local businesses. The remaining revenues are passed
to the individual states for redistribution among their communities
on a per capita basis.
Another common problem is unrealistically low municipal charges
for supplying residents or commercial establishments with water, or
accepting their wastewaters or garbage, reflecting political ex-
pediency rather than actual costs. As a result, supply systems are
often poorly maintained and treatment plants are insufficient and
inadequate. Countless cities the world over simply unload raw sewage
and industrial effluents directly into already polluted rivers. The
answer is not to look to the nation's capital for more and more
central support, for however much aid is promised it invariably falls
short of the needs. Rather the answer is to form more regional waste
disposal districts and to pay the actual cost of operating them. The
former requires overcoming local pride to gain the economic effi-
ciencies of regionalization; the latter requires having the political
courage to vote for new garbage and sewage treatment plants rather
than new stadiums and swimming pools.
C Set Flexible Legal Standards to be Administered
According to the State of the Art
In a young and swiftly moving field such as environmental control
and technology, laws need to be written so that they can be adminis-
tered according to the latest knowledge. Legal definitions are rarely
flexible enough to cover the many new developments and discoveries
in this field, and, as a result, many serious problems are inadequately
handled because they do not fit the scope of the legislature's pre-
vious formulations. Likewise, if specific technical details are written
into a law it is often necessary to change them to reflect continuing
advances.
One way of dealing with this problem is to provide the maximum
and minimum standards acceptable to the legislature in the law and
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to include a provision that the law be administered within these
limits according to the current state of the art. If this is done there
must be ways to insure that administrators do not abuse their dis-
cretion, and to incorporate recent advances in scientific or technolog-
ical understanding into the daily execution of the law.
In Germany, the minister responsible for supervising the adminis-
tration of a law according to the state of technology publishes
directives which bind administrators to exercise their discretion
within the limits set by the minister, which in turn must be within
those established by the law. If an administrator exceeds these guide-
lines by granting permission to a factory to discharge over the
maximum allowed in the limits, for example, he may be relieved of
his post or subject to lesser disciplines provided by the laws govern-
ing the civil service.
It is largely left to private enterprise, research centers, and indi-
viduals to provide the input which causes the minister to modify the
administration of the law according to current knowledge. Suppose
permissible automobile exhaust emissions were so regulated. If a Mr.
Acme developed a device in his basement which if built into all cars
would reduce their emissions by 95%, he could present it to the
supervising ministry for complete testing in state laboratories. On the
basis of the tests, the minister would decide whether it was tech-
nically feasible and economically reasonable to require the device. If
so, he would promulgate regulations requiring all future manu-
factured cars to have it. If not, Mr. Acme would be so informed.
Either decision by the minister would constitute an administrative
act in German law, subject to administrative court review.
Legislative deadlines for achieving such standards as a 95% reduc-
tion in auto emissions may be a necessary spur, if they are realistic.
The U.S. Congress has set 1975 for this goal, with the possibility of a
one-year extension if absolutely necessary.'" In 1961 the German
parliament similarly required detergents to be manufactured with less
permanent sudsing agents within three years." s But care should be
taken not to simply build castles in the air in setting such deadlines.
Then they merely serve to arouse public expectations which in turn
tend politically to lock legislators into what may have been a mis-
14. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690, amending42 U.S.C. § 1857(f) (1963).
15. Gesetz Uber Detergentien In Wasch- und Reinigungsmitteln (Law Concerning De-
tergents in Washing and Cleaning Agents) of Sep. 5, 1961, [19611 BGB1. I 1653, as
amended May 24, 1968, BGB1. 1 503. The applicable regulations are contained in the
Verordnung Ober Die Abbaubarkeit von Detergentien In Wasch- und Reinigungsmitteln
(Regulations Concerning the Degradability of Detergents in Washing and Cleaning Agents)
of Dec. 1, 1962, BGB1. 1 698.
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take. This could result either in the law not being enforced when the
deadline comes or in unnecessary hardships if violations are in fact
prosecuted. Even if such deadlines are included, provisions should be
made for adopting technical advancements as they develop, so that
attainable progress is not unnecessarily postponed.
D. Work Toward the Equalization of Burdens on
Industry in All Countries
The burdens placed on business and industry by environmental
policies need to be coordinated, both intra- and internationally, to
avoid giving unwarranted economic advantages to any particular area
or country. The Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic
Community provides that no member country's government may
offer industry special advantages which undermine the common com-
mercial basis within the community.'6
A similar principle needs to be extended to world commercial
activity, so that no country can gain a larger share of the markets
simply by allowing its enterprises to cut costs and keep their prices
lower by abusing the environment. Some state governments in the
United States are familiar with industry's threats to move to or
locate in other states with less stringent standards for environmental
protection. The result has often been reluctance to move ahead of
the lowest common denominator. In Europe some industries,
notably steel and chemicals, have either located new plants in or
moved to permissive countries with long coastlines in order to avoid
internalizing their externalities. Elsewhere in the world, some nations
have benefited economically at nature's expense by condoning the
dumping of millions of tons of waste and poison into the ocean.
This situation is both economically unfair and environmentally
unwise. The world's natural resources can be conserved only if the
major export-producing countries, both developed and developing,
agree to enforce policies which prohibit gaining competitive ad-
vantage by ignoring external costs. Just as such inequities are avoided
within a country by adopting national standards, joint economic
action on a worldwide basis is necessary so that no country's com-
merce is unfairly disadvantaged. Perhaps a framework treaty, with
standards regulated in detail by more limited agreements under it,
would be an appropriate vehicle to achieve this needed equalization.
16. See Treaty of the Inter-governmental Conference on The Common Market and
Euratom, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 92 and 95, [1957] Europaeische Gemeinschaften 2(G), 296
U.N.T.S. 2.
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PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC
A. Expand the Citizens' Role in Public Planning,
But Provide a Cut-Off
Proposed public projects in many countries are subject to scrutiny
both from within the government and without. A German water
association's draft plans for building a large sewage treatment plant
must be approved by a state minister with authority over water,
agriculture, and natural resources.' 7 Before he gives his approval, his
professional staff, as well as the staffs of other interested ministers
(i.e., public health, transportation) discuss the plan, considering how
the proposed plant will fit into their own overall plans. The minister
thereby assures that developments in his field will be internally co-
ordinated, and harmonized with those in other fields. This is essential
to environmental planning policy and execution.
Many governments also provide an opportunity for their citizens
to register their opinions. However, often there is no apparent pos-
sibility that objections or suggestions will be seriously considered. On
the other hand, sometimes there seems to be no way to put an end to
considerations and to proceed with executing a plan. Consolidated
Edison's efforts to provide for increasing electricity demands in New
York City are an illustration of the delays which can result if no
cut-off date for registering objections exists. Because no opportunity
for public input into the development of plans was ever given, end-
less litigation has resulted from each successive announcement of
intentions.
To solve this dilemma, German administrative law provides a
system which has proved fair and effective. After the minister gives
his general approval-often conditional-he forwards the plan to the
state's chief regional administrator for the area where the project is
to be carried out. This administrator holds a Plan Determination
Proceeding, which may take several years. It is not unlike many
similar procedures in the U.S.: notice is given the public in news-
papers, the plan is displayed in public before an open hearing, writ-
ten objections and oral testimony are accepted, conferences between
the administrator and all concerned parties take place, expert
opinions are sometimes sought, etc. Quite frequently, the plan is
modified in response to legitimate individual objections. Ultimately
it is promulgated by the administrator, an act which may be chal-
lenged in an administrative court by anyone burdened by it. The
17. Kneese & Bower, Managing Water Quality, Economics, Technology, Institutions 262,
n.4 (1968). E.g., Ruhrreinhaltungsgesetz § 2(3) of June 5, 1913, PrGSNW 210.
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court may not simply replace the administrator's exercise of dis-
cretion with its own opinion.
A citizen, or a group representing citizen interests, has a comple-
mentary obligation of prompt participation. If objections are not
raised within the period allowed by the Plan Determination Proceed-
ing-usually within two weeks after public display and discussion-
they are foreclosed from being entered. This prevents playing dog in
the manger and continually delaying a plan's execution. Once the
approved plan has been adjusted and promulgated by the adminis-
trator in its final form, it is fixed. If an affected party files a com-
plaint with the administrative court the plan's implementation is
delayed, unless special permission to proceed is sought and gained
from the court because of an overriding public interest. He who
proceeds does so at the risk of having to modify what he has done
according to the court decision. Only unforeseen eventualities, e.g.,
odors from a sewage treatment plant due to unexpected wastes it
must process, arising from the plan may be challenged after it has
been undertaken. Both meaningful public participation with oppor-
tunity for appeal to the courts and a firm cut-off are necessary to
efficient planning to meet the expanding demands on our en-
vironment.
B. Exert Public Pressure for Adequate Funding and Enforcement
Too often, public response to the discovery of another environ-
mental crisis is a demand for new legislation. Sometimes, if the prob-
lem is novel, there may be no applicable legal provisions, and if this is
the case, a law should then be drafted carefully and with the
minimum of procedural hurdles impeding the realization of its pur-
poses. But this need exists in only a few areas of the world. The real
needs now increasingly recognized are adapting existing laws to cur-
rent conditions, amending them for easier administration and en-
forcement, and assuring that adequate means are provided for their
conscientious execution by qualified and dedicated personnel.
A law is only as effective as public consciousness allows it to be
and a sufficient number of concerned people insists that it be.
Politicians must be pressured to allocate and appropriate much more
money for comprehensive environmental programs-research, plan-
ning, enforcement, and reform. Public speeches about rearranging
priorities are not enough. Our representatives must be shown that if
they do not represent us, they will lose their seats. Once the money
is voted, the administrative programs it supports must be carefully
monitored. Bureaucrats respond to complaints and reminders from
466 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 11
the public, and if they do not, they can be prodded to do so by
politicians.
In the environmental field, at least, the democratic political system
seems to be responsive to the people it was designed to serve. But
environmentally oriented constituencies must work for the results
they want. It is a proven proposition that they will succeed in direct
proportion to the extent that they are organized, informed, reason-
able, persuasive, and persistent. Maintaining a healthy balance be-
tween public needs and private interests can be frustrating, time-
consuming, even exhausting; but settling for less is an abdication of
responsibility to ourselves and our heirs.
